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I begin by contrasting a taxonomic approach to the vestibular system with the
structural approach I take in the bulk of this commentary. I provide an analysis of
perspectival structure. Employing that analysis and following the structural ap-
proach, I propose three lines of empirical investigation to selectively manipulate
and measure vestibular processing and perspectival structure. The hope is that
this  serves to  indicate  how interdisciplinary research  on vestibular  processing
might advance our understanding of the structural features of conscious experi-
ence.
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1 Structural vs. taxonomic approaches to 
vestibular processes
Philosophical  work  on  the  senses  has  largely
been  concerned  with  taxonomic  issues:  What
makes an event sensory? Under which sensory
kind should that event be classified? Answering
these  questions  requires  criteria  of  individu-
ation.  These  would  enable  us  to  determine
whether an event is the same as (or different to)
sensory events in general and whether it is the
same as (or different to) sensory events of a spe-
cific kind. A criterion of the first sort would al-
low us to identify vestibular events as sensory
events. This would justify the belief that vesti-
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bular  processes  are  sensory  processes.  A  cri-
terion  of  the  second  sort  would  allow  us  to
identify vestibular sensory events as being of a
specific kind, i.e.,  distinctively vestibular sens-
ory events.  This  would justify the belief  that
there is such a thing as a vestibular sense. Fail-
ing to provide a criterion of the first sort would
force one to classify vestibular events as non-
sensory. But even if one were able to determine
that  vestibular  events  are  sensory,  one  would
still  require  a  criterion  of  the  second sort  to
classify vestibular events as sensory events of a
kind that is distinct from, e.g., visual or haptic
events.
To expand on this last point: as Lenggen-
hager and Lopez so masterfully describe, central
vestibular processes are inherently multisensory,
and as a consequence there is scarcely a part of
our  sensory  and  cognitive  life  that  vestibular
processes leave untouched (see especially §2.2 of
the target article). But then, if vestibular pro-
cesses  are implicated in  so many sensory and
cognitive processes, it may be most accurate to
see vestibular processing as simply a common
part of many processes, rather than as an inde-
pendent sensory system. That is, one may begin
to seriously consider the possibility that vesti-
bular processing does not constitute a form of
sensory processing of its own kind, but rather
constitutes  a  form  of  processing  common  to
various  other  processes  that  are  themselves
sensory. This is, in effect, an issue that arises
from applying a criterion for individuating the
senses that includes the physiology (and neuro-
physiology) of the entire system. One might not
be forced to this conclusion if one used an al-
ternative criterion (Macpherson 2011a,  2011b).
But it seems that each of the criteria commonly
discussed  would  generate  their  own  problems.
For instance, employing a more restrictive cri-
terion that delimited sensory systems according
to  their  peripheral  sensory  organs  would  face
the issue of whether the sensory organs of the
vestibular  system ought to include or  exclude
the so-called “truncal” or “somatic” gravicept-
ors (Mittelstaedt 1992, 1996; Vaitl et al. 2002).
Similar issues would be faced when attempting
to individuate the senses in terms of a distinct-
ive proximal stimulus. Alternatively, one might
individuate the senses by means of certain dis-
tinctive experiences: vision distinctively repres-
ents the brightness, hue, and saturation of col-
ours; audition represents the volume, pitch, and
tone of sounds. The natural candidates for the
vestibular  system  would  be  experiences  that
represent  verticality,  rotation,  and translation.
But whilst it is certain that the vestibular sys-
tem typically contributes to experiences of ver-
ticality, rotation, and translation, these are all
experiences of a kind that can be had through
visual  sensation alone,  or  through a combina-
tion of visual, somatic, and proprioceptive sen-
sation.  Moreover,  although  vertiginous  experi-
ences  are  the  hallmark  of  vestibular  dysfunc-
tion,  these  are  either  experiences  of  rotation,
which brings us back to the aforementioned is-
sue,  or  they  are  more  vaguely  classified  as
pseudo-vertiginous experiences of dizziness that
may have any number of non-vestibular aetiolo-
gies. Suffice to say that it may be surprisingly
difficult  to  find  appropriate criteria  to  justify
the claim that there is such a thing as a  dis-
tinctively vestibular sensory process.
The foregoing characterises what would be
the typical philosophical approach to the vesti-
bular  system,  qua sensory  system.  This  taxo-
nomic  approach captures  certain  philosophical
interests, but it is completely inadequate for the
task  of  bringing  out  the  significance  of  the
scope of  the vestibular system’s influence.  An
alternative,  structural  approach focuses  on the
role  played  by  vestibular  events  in  processes
that exhibit a certain kind of structure, to de-
termine the contribution of those events to that
structure.  Note  that  the  structural  and taxo-
nomic  approaches  are  independent,  insofar  as
they have different epistemic goals. They aim to
further  our  knowledge  in  different  ways.  The
goal of the taxonomic approach is to determine
whether,  and if  so  why,  there is  a distinctive
sensory system of a certain kind. The goal of
the  structural  approach  is  to  determine
whether, and if so how, a certain kind of pro-
cess contributes to a certain kind of structure.
By assuming that one can identify processes as
objects of study without first employing an ex-
haustive  taxonomy,  a  structural  approach can
assume that there are such things as vestibular
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processes  without  any  commitment  to  these
processes  being  wholly  distinct  from  others.
And by tracking the varied yet systematic ef-
fects of vestibular processes, one can determine
whether vestibular processes contribute to a cer-
tain kind of structure, irrespective of, whether
or  not  the  vestibular  system  is  a  distinctive
sensory system. As vestibular processes are im-
plicated  in  so  many and various  sensory  and
cognitive  processes,  the  structural  approach
seems to be the most fruitful in terms of the
amount  we  might  learn.  It  also  seems  more
fruitful in terms of  the kind of knowledge we
might  gain.  For  we may learn  nothing  about
how vestibular processes affect our experiential
life  by learning  that  vestibular  processes  may
not  be,  in  the  final  analysis,  of  a  distinctive
sensory kind. But we will certainly learn some-
thing about how vestibular processes affect our
experiential life by learning that vestibular pro-
cesses contribute to a certain experiential struc-
ture. Accordingly, I leave aside taxonomic issues
in  the  rest  of  this  commentary and focus  on
structural issues. Specifically, I focus on issues
concerning the role of the vestibular system in
providing a particular kind of structure to our
experience of the body and the world, namely a
perspectival structure.
To begin with, we need a preliminary ana-
lysis of experiential phenomena that exhibit per-
spectival structure. I will call these  perspectival
phenomena. In the next section, I offer a rudi-
mentary  analysis  of  perspectival  structure,  the
aim of which is to show that perspectival phe-
nomena are more differentiated than commonly
recognised. In the following three sections, I pro-
pose three lines of empirical investigation. Each
would attempt to selectively  study perspectival
phenomena through measurement and manipula-
tion of  vestibular  processes.  If  the  experiments
proposed yielded interesting results, they would
further our knowledge of how vestibular processes
affect the perspectival structure of our experien-
tial life. Accordingly, the overall aim is to demon-
strate how an analysis of perspectival structure
might fruitfully interface with empirical research
and facilitate understanding of structural features
of conscious experience that would otherwise be
obscured.
2 The differentiation of perspectival 
phenomena
The notion of a subjective perspective (some-
times  described  as a  first-person perspective)
is  at  the  core  of  contemporary  research  on
bodily self-consciousness (Blanke & Metzinger
2009; Metzinger 2003, 2009). However, its role
has often been merely facilitative, serving as a
means  to  study  other components  of  bodily
self-consciousness,  such  as  the  experience  of
bodily  agency,  ownership,  and  self-location
(Ehrsson 2007;  Lenggenhager et  al. 2007;
Petkova et al. 2011a, see Serino et al. 2013 for
review). Consequently, the fact that the very
notion of perspective covers a range of distinct
phenomena has tended to be overlooked.1 Re-
ferring to someone’s perceptual experience as
having a perspectival structure may mean any
one  of  several  distinct  things.  It  may  mean
that there is an origin to her sensory field, rel-
ative  to  which  certain  things  (or  parts  of
things) are perceptible  and perceived from a
particular direction and relative to which cer-
tain other things (or parts of things) are not
perceptible or noticeably occluded.2 Alternat-
ively, it may mean that her experience is or-
ganised  according  to  an  egocentric frame  of
reference centred upon her body, according to
which she experiences locations as situated re-
lative to a particular point at the intersection
of three orthogonal axes. Or it may be that,
thanks to  egomotion,  the flow of her sensory
experience is such that she can see where she
is headed as she moves. Taking  another indi-
vidual’s perspective into account in social in-
teractions can involve either  of  the first  two
forms of perspective (Moll &  Meltzoff 2011).
1 My discussion is restricted to spatial perspectival phenomena; I omit
discussion of the respects in which temporal experience may be per-
spectival. This is mostly for the sake of simplicity. However, there is
good reason to think that we represent time in a manner that is
asymmetrically  dependent  upon  the  ways  in  which  we  represent
space (Boroditsky 2000;  Casasanto & Boroditsky 2008). Addressing
issues concerning the structure of spatial experience first may thus
be prudent. 
2 This notion is intended to capture the idea that there is a point of
“origin” to the so-called line of sight (which is not so much a line as
an angle). This corresponds to perhaps the earliest documented no-
tion  of  perceptual  perspective,  associated  with  what  Euclid  and
Ptolemy respectively called the “visual pyramid” and “visual cone”,
where the apex (origin) of the pyramid or cone is at the eye and the
base at the object (Howard 2012).
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Moreover, the perspective of the subject need
not figure explicitly in the experience for it to
be perspectival; perspective can structure per-
ceptual  experience  implicitly,  by determining
the  way  in  which  objects  are  experienced,
without itself being part of the content of the
experience (Campbell 1994;  Merleau-Ponty
2002; Perry 1993; Zahavi 2005).
We can summarise these remarks by say-
ing that perspectival phenomena in spatial ex-
perience  vary  along three  dimensions.3 First,
perspectival structure can take at least three
forms: 4
• Origin of a sensory field (origin) 
• Centre  of  an  egocentric  frame  of  reference
(egocentric)
• Focal point of a sensory flow field in action
(egomotion) 
3 I do not intend the following to be exhaustive. Moreover, although
all of the perspectival phenomena that I discuss are visual, I do be-
lieve that each of the forms of perspectival structure that I describe
also characterises perspectival experience in haptic perception.
4 The most I intend to claim here is that these forms of perspectival
structure  are  non-identical.  Perhaps the origin  of a given sensory
field, the centre of a given egocentric frame of reference, and the fo-
cal point of a given sensory flow field could occupy the same location
under some description. However, this certainly need not always be
the case. Moreover, each form of perspectival structure will present
the objects of perceptual experience as related to the subject of ex-
perience in different ways, e.g., as only partially visible, as straight
ahead, or as in one’s way. Below I will suggest various ways in which
these might be selectively manipulated, but I do not intend to make
the case that forms of perspectival structure can be dissociated from
one another.
 
Perspectival  phenomena that  exhibit  any
of these forms of perspectival structure can vary
along two further dimensions: the perspective of
a  given perspectival  experience may be either
implicit or  explicit,  and may be attributed to
the  subject  or  to  another  individual.  A  per-
spective is explicit in a perspectival experience if
the subject is consciously aware of the location
of the origin, centre, or focal point in question;
it is implicit if the subject is not.5 The perspect-
ive  in  question  may belong  to  the  subject,  a
first-person perspective, or it may belong to an-
other individual, a third-person perspective.
This  simple  framework  enables  one  to
study perspectival phenomena selectively, rather
than studying an undifferentiated cluster of per-
spectival phenomena simultaneously. In the sec-
tions that follow, I shall suggest a number of
ways in which one might engage in such a se-
lective study of perspectival phenomena by in-
5 When a perspective is explicit, the location of the origin, centre,
or focal point is part of the content of the experience. Any beliefs
that  the subject  has  about  the  location in  question do  not  go
beyond  the  content  of  that  experience  (cf.  Peacocke 1999,  p.
265). The experience may represent the location in question in an
imprecise or wholly incorrect manner; the subject’s beliefs will be
correspondingly  imprecise  or  incorrect.  Implicit  perspectives
structure experience without being part of the content of experi -
ence. I leave it open whether implicit perspectives are neverthe -
less experienced qua structural feature, or whether, for example,
they  are  merely  formal  structures  that  determine  the  ways  in
which things  are  experienced,  without  themselves  being experi-
enced. Issues like this are difficult to evaluate, but for discussion
see Alsmith (2012). 
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tervening upon and registering the activation of
vestibular processes.
3 Perspectival variation in multisensory 
stimulation
One consequence  of  not  distinguishing  between
perspectival phenomena is that the notion of a
first-person perspective  becomes ambiguous. One
can clearly see this ambiguity in descriptions of
the role of  first-person perspective in the multis-
ensory stimulation protocols developed in recent
work on the neuroscience of bodily self-conscious-
ness. These protocols all involve participants be-
ing  touched  on  their  torso  whilst  visually  ob-
serving a body-shape (either the body of another
person, a mannequin, or a virtual body) being
touched on its torso. The protocols differ along
two dimensions: the side of the torso stimulated
and the location of the origin of the participants’
line of sight with respect to the body being ob-
served. In one protocol, the body-swap illusion,
participants are stroked on their chest whilst they
look at a body being stroked on its chest from a
position  located  where  its  head  would  be  (cf.
Ehrsson 2007; see Petkova et al. 2011b;  Petkova
&  Ehrsson 2008;  Petkova et al. 2011a). In an-
other protocol, the full-body illusion, participants
are stroked on their back, whilst they observe a
body from behind being stroked on its back from
a  position  entirely  removed  from  its  location
(Ionta et  al. 2011;  Lenggenhager et  al. 2007;
Pfeiffer et al. 2013). The body-swap illusion pro-
tocol is often distinguished from the full-body il-
lusion protocol as involving first-person perspect-
ive  as  an  independent  variable  (Petkova et  al.
2011a). However, recent work on the full-body il-
lusion has demonstrated effects that the authors
describe  as  changes  in  first-person  perspective
(Pfeiffer et  al. 2014):  Participants  lain  prone
whilst feeling and observing strokes on the back
report experiences of either looking up or down at
the body they observe (Ionta et al. 2011). These
variations in report seem to depend upon the in-
dividual’s  relative  weighting  of  vestibular  and
visual gravitational cues (Pfeiffer et al. 2013).
Admitting  the  differentiation  of  per-
spectival phenomena allows us to make sense of
the differences in use of the term  first-person
perspective. In the terms introduced in the pre-
vious section, the first-person perspective in the
body-swap illusion is an  origin perspective.  It
presents  the  typical  view  of  one’s  own  body
with a line of sight originating in the head. The
first-person perspective in the full-body illusion
is an egocentric perspective. It forms the centre
of an egocentric frame of reference, according to
which the observed body occupies a location in
a particular egocentric direction (up or down).
Distinguishing these forms of  first-person per-
spectival experience reveals that each of these
protocols facilitates manipulation of  a distinct
form of  perspectival  experience.  It  also  sheds
light on the fact that the differences in vestibu-
lar and somatosensory processing between these
forms of perspectival experience have yet to be
compared.
One way of conducting such a comparison
would  be  to  use  virtual  reality  display  tech-
niques to present an individual with two avatars
in series, whilst measuring time-locked vestibu-
lar evoked potentials via scalp EEG. 
Experiment 1: Participants are stroked on
both their  chest  and their  back whilst  supine,
whilst wearing a head-mounted display. In the
meantime, participants observe either the chest
of Avatar 1 being stroked on its chest, presented
from a position  corresponding  to the avatar’s
head, as in the body-swap illusion, or they ob-
serve Avatar 2 being stroked on its back, as in
the full-body illusion. Ideally,  the two avatars
are  presented  in  the same viewing,  such  that
the participant views one avatar and then in a
continuous movement shifts their gaze to view
the other.6
I have claimed that each of the two pro-
tocols  conjoined in  this  proposed experiment
facilitates  manipulation  of  different  forms  of
perspectival experience. If this is correct, then
finding significant  differences  in  vestibularly-
evoked  potentials  between  observation  of
Avatar 1 and Avatar 2 would be a first step in
determining  differences  in  vestibular  pro-
cessing  between  these  forms  of  perspectival
experience.
6 This would be, I take it, as close as practically possible to viewing
the two avatars at the same time, given limitations in the field of
view.
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As noted earlier, there do seem to be indi-
vidual differences in the contents of  egocentric
perspectival experience in the full-body illusion.
This would suggest that some individuals, those
who are more heavily dependent upon vestibu-
lar gravitational cues to determine orientation,
would experience themselves as looking upwards
at Avatar 2. Whereas if the right visual gravita-
tional cues were provided, some individuals may
experience themselves as looking downwards at
Avatar 2 (Ionta et al. 2011; Pfeiffer et al. 2013).
This might allow the investigation of the rela-
tionship  between  egocentric  perspectives  and
egomotion  perspectives,  by  incorporating  a
second phase into a new experiment: 
Experiment 2: Phase 1: experiment 1, de-
scribed above. Phase 2: Participants continue to
be stroked on their back and chest. Participants
fixate  upon  Avatar  2  and  observe  it  rotating
about  a  horizontal  axis,  whilst  being  visibly
stroked on its back and chest. Both reports of
experienced orientation (upward vs. downward)
and  reports  of  experienced  egomotion are
gathered.
Participants  may  experiences  themselves
as rotating around a horizontal axis in just the
way they observe Avatar 2 rotating. Alternat-
ively, they might experience themselves as re-
volving  around  Avatar  2.  In  particular,  what
would be of interest would be the way in which
any resultant illusory experiences of  egomotion
might correlate with experienced egocentric ori-
entation (upward vs. downward). Moreover, in-
dividual  differences  in  experienced  egocentric
orientation might even predict the contents of
experienced  egomotion. This would be a major
step in determining both the relative influence
of vestibular processing on these forms of per-
spectival  experience  and  the  relationship
between these forms of perspectival experience.
4 Perspectival variation in misalignment
In much recent philosophical and neuroscientific
research on self-consciousness,  the experienced
first-person  perspective is  treated  as  a  simple
phenomenon identified with the experienced ori-
gin of an  egocentric  frame of reference centred
upon an individual’s own body (Blanke & Met-
zinger 2009;  Vogeley &  Fink 2003).  But  ego-
centric perspective, despite being an apparently
simple  phenomenon,  is  in  fact  as  potentially
complex  as  the  macroscopic  structure  of  the
body  itself  (Smith 2010).  Human  bodies  are
composed of a number of parts that are to some
degree independently mobile, any of which may
serve to centre a distinct egocentric frame of ref-
erence.  As this  observation is  well  known, we
may  presume  that  theorists  who  treat  ego-
centric perspective as simple are assuming that
locations in these various egocentric frames of
reference are translated into a single,  ultimate
egocentric frame reference which itself determ-
ines egocentric perspectival phenomena. 
However, neurophysiological and neuropsy-
chological  research  on  spatial  representation
suggests  independent  motivation  for  this  ulti-
mate frame being centred upon the head (e.g.,
Avillac et al. 2005) or the torso (e.g.,  Karnath
et al. 1991). By rotating head and torso in op-
posite directions, an egocentric frame of refer-
ence centred upon the head can be misaligned
with another frame centred upon the torso. In
such a “misalignment” situation, a single object
may be “to the right” with respect to the head
and  “to  the  left”  with  respect  to  the  torso
(Longo & Alsmith 2013). Following Christopher
Peacocke’s (1992) description of the phenomen-
ology of experienced direction, one would hypo-
thesise that differences in experienced posture
would  determine  differences  in  egocentric per-
spectival experience.7 One could thus use mis-
7 Peacocke  writes: “The use of a particular set of labeled axes in giving
part of the content of an experience is not a purely notational or conven-
tional matter. The appropriate set of labeled axes captures distinctions
in the phenomenology of experience itself. Looking straight ahead at
Buckingham Palace is one experience. It is another to look at the palace
with one’s face still toward it but with one’s body turned toward a point
on the right. In this second case the palace is experienced as being off to
one side from the direction of straight ahead, even if the view remains
exactly the same as in the first case” (1992, p. 62). Assuming that Pea-
cocke’s prediction is correct, then in this example changes in the ego-
centric perspectival structure of visual experience follow changes in the
orientation of the torso. By misaligning the torso from the direction of
the gaze, one discerns that (in the case as described) the appropriate set
of labelled axes centre upon the torso. In the paradigm described in ex-
periment 3, both head and torso may be misaligned with the individual’s
gaze. This makes it possible to determine the contribution of both head-
and torso-centred frames of reference to the individual’s egocentric per-
spectival experience of a given location. It would then be possible to dis-
cern whether, for the egocentric perspectival experience of a given loca-
tion: (i) the appropriate set of axes centre on the torso; (ii) the axes
centre on the head; (iii) both sets of axes make relative contributions to
the structure of the experience.
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alignment situations to determine the respective
contributions of the head and the torso to the
organisation  of  egocentric perspectival  experi-
ence at a given point in time in the following
experiment: 
Experiment  3:  Standing  with  their  head
and  torso  aligned  or  misaligned  ±15°,  parti-
cipants perform a task that involves either an
explicit or only an  implicit egocentric perspect-
ive (see  below).  The angular  deviation  of  the
stimulus in relation to the head and/or torso is
recorded, such that one would be able assess the
respective contributions of each body-part’s ori-
entation  to  the  participants  egocentric per-
spectival judgments. Participants would receive
either galvanic vestibular stimulation (GVS) or
tendon vibration stimulation to precisely assess
the relative contribution of vestibular processes
to egocentric perspective.
In more detail, the suggestions are these.
For an explicit task, stimuli could be presented
across the entire visual field in regular intervals,
varying  in  distance  and  elevation,  and  parti-
cipants would judge whether a stimulus presen-
ted looks “to their left or to their right”. A po-
tential limitation of the explicit task is that in
using overt left/right judgements, participants’
responses may reflect a stipulated meaning of
these  terms  that  is  independent  of  the  ego-
centric perspectival  structure  of  their  experi-
ence. However, a recent study using a covert at-
tentional cuing paradigm found that rotation of
the torso primes participants to respond more
quickly to visual stimuli appearing on the side
of a computer screen congruent to the direction
of rotation (Grubb &  Reed 2002).8 One could
adapt this paradigm to directly compare the re-
spective influences of head and torso by rotat-
ing the head and/or the torso ±15° relative to
the  screen  where  stimuli  would  be  presented.
Target and cueing visual stimuli would appear
on either congruent or incongruent sides of the
screen and participants would make speed re-
sponses to indicate whether the target appears
to the left or the right on each trial. Again, as
8 It is perhaps worth noting that by “congruent” I intend the more
general sense of the term, as often used in describing the design of
behavioural studies, the meaning of which is equivalent to “in agree-
ment”.  I do not intend the more specific geometrical  sense of the
term, which expresses identity of a certain kind, typically of form.
the angular deviation of the stimulus in relation
to the head and/or torso would be known, one
would  be  able  assess  the  respective  contribu-
tions of each body-part’s orientation to the par-
ticipant’s egocentric perspectival judgments. 
Based on previous work,  I  would expect
participants’ judgements to implicate both their
head  and torso as determining their  egocentric
perspectival  experience  (Alsmith &  Longo
2014).  More  specifically,  I  would  expect  that
both head- and torso-centred reference frames
would influence  explicit and  implicit egocentric
perspectival  phenomena  (Longo &  Alsmith
2013), though the exact weighting will be un-
equal at lateral extremes of each body part and
will differ between individuals (Alsmith et al. in
preparation).  The further  prediction would be
that manipulating vestibular and proprioceptive
processing will modulate felt postural misalign-
ment and thereby systematically influence per-
formance on explicit and implicit egocentric per-
spectival tasks. 
5 Perspectival variation in sensorimotor 
control
Arguably, one of the core structural features of
the  experience  of  intentionally-directed  bodily
movement is the presentation of the agent as the
“perspectival source” of the motion experienced
(Horgan et al. 2003;  Marcel 2006). However,  a
strikingly robust experimental finding is that indi-
viduals will correct for a deviation introduced into
a movement they perform via a bias in visual in-
put,  thereby  ensuring  the  action  they  intend
achieves its goal, whilst nevertheless not reporting
such corrections in their movement (Fourneret &
Jeannerod 1998;  Knoblich &  Kircher 2004;
Slachevsky et al. 2001). Recent developments of
this paradigm have adapted it to test explicit ego-
motion perspectival experience in walking move-
ments,  by  using  a  motion-tracked  avatar,  ob-
served  from the  rear.  Kannape  and  colleagues
found that by introducing a slight bias into the
subject’s visual experience of the trajectory of the
avatar, they could induce subjects to perform ap-
propriate corrective movements in walking to a
target, whilst not noting the discrepancy between
their actual movements and the avatar (Kannape
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et al. 2010). Again, the corrections went largely
unnoticed within a certain range of angular devi-
ation between observed and actual movements.9
Thus, a natural explanation of the pattern of data
is that the mechanisms enabling the experience of
agency present  bodily movements in  a manner
that is far more coarse-grained than the level of
detail  required  to  make  corrective  changes  in
movement  trajectory.  In  short,  egomotion per-
spectives  structure  experiences  of  intentionally-
directed bodily movement. They do so by specify-
ing what we might call coarse-grained phenom-
enal grooves, within which a movement must un-
fold if it is to seem like the movement that the
subject intended or is trying to perform.
Strangely, as yet the potential contributions
of  the  vestibular  system  to  the  structuring  of
agentive experience by egomotion perspective have
not been manipulated. Moreover,  as noted, the
work that has been done in this area has been re-
stricted  to  explicit  egomotion perspectival  phe-
nomena. A natural further step would be to in-
vestigate the nature of  vestibular  processing in
implicit egomotion perspective,  by controlling a
participant’s optic flow in a manner correspond-
ing to the control of the avatar’s motion in Kan-
nape and colleagues’ original study.
Experiment 4: Study 1: Participants view
a textured environment via HMD in which op-
tical flow fields are regulated by their motion-
tracked movements. Study 2: Participants con-
trol  a  motion-tracked,  real-time  avatar  seen
from behind. In both studies,  participants are
tasked with walking directly towards a virtual
target. All the while, they either receive GVS or
sham  stimulation  and  visual  feedback  (optic
flow or avatar position) that is either faithful to
motion-tracking  or  systematically  deviated
left/right  of  the  participant’s  mid-line,  as  a
function of  distance from a point  of  displace-
ment onset. 
Participant trajectory could thus be com-
pared  to  the  dynamics  of  the  flow  field  or
avatar  trajectory  and  participants  could  be
9 The authors write that “deviations of 5◦, 10◦, and 15◦ lead to many
erroneous self-attributions”, found to be “decreasing in magnitude
with increasing angular deviation” (Kannape et al. 2010, p. 1631).
As broached above, one explanation of this pattern would be that
deviations below 15◦ all fall (to a greater or lesser degree) within the
phenomenal groove of the action specified by the task.
asked to rate the degree to which their move-
ments in the virtual environment or the move-
ments of the avatar corresponded to their actual
movements,  as  respective  measures  of  implicit
and explicit  egomotion perspectival experience.
The  question  would  be  whether,  in  trials  in
which GVS is applied, the range of angular de-
viation in which participants would judge that
movements  in  the  virtual  environment  corres-
pond to their own would be equal to or larger
than  trials  in  which  participants  receive  only
biased visual feedback. If the latter occurs, then
in the evocative terms used above, it would sug-
gest that vestibular processes are one of the de-
terminants of the coarseness of the phenomenal
groove specified by an egomotion perspective.
6 Conclusion
I began by contrasting a taxonomic approach to
the  vestibular  system with  the  structural  ap-
proach I have taken in the bulk of  this com-
mentary.  I  then  provided  an  analysis  of  per-
spectival structure. Employing that analysis and
following  the  structural  approach,  I  proposed
three lines of empirical investigation that would
selectively  manipulate  and  measure  vestibular
processing and perspectival structure.
Day & Fitzpatrick (2005) quip that vesti-
bular processes provide a “silent sense” (see also
§2.2.1 of the target article). I suggested at the
outset that (following the taxonomic approach)
it might be surprisingly difficult to say with any
precision why vestibular processing provides a
sense of its very own. But even if it is true, that
is, if the experiments described yield the expec-
ted  results,  they  would  show  that  vestibular
processing is hardly silent. Indeed, each of the
proposed lines of investigation would be a step
towards a better understanding of how vestibu-
lar processes affect myriad forms of perspectival
structure,  all  of  which  would  further  demon-
strate the centrality of vestibular processing to
our experiential  life.  In any case,  my hope is
that these remarks display the extent to which I
have found Lenggenhager and Lopez’s work to
be not only inspirational, but also a rich and
fruitful avenue for interdisciplinary research into
the structural features of conscious experience.
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